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Executive Summary
This project highlights the security vulnerabilities and discusses the attack surface of the Controller
Area Network (CAN) bus. As the de facto technology for In-Vehicle Network (IVN) backbones,
the CAN bus can be found in all automobiles nowadays. Therefore, any vulnerabilities in such a
system have widespread implications for the safety and security of society. Our simulation findings
are supplemented by hardware implementation of particular event triggers on an actual vehicle.
We demonstrate the lack of security by eavesdropping, reverse engineering, and spoofing CAN
frames. These measures shine a light on the need for securing CAN bus by redesign.
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1. Introduction
The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus was originally developed in the 1980s but became
standard in most vehicles by 1993. The CAN bus provides a solution to vehicles’ increasingly
complex wiring and communication needs as vehicles adapt more and more electrical subsystems.
Each electric subsystem in a vehicle is controlled by an Electronic Control Module (ECM). Most
subsystems require some degree of communication with other subsystems to coordinate activity or
trigger actuators. The original vehicle network design used point-to-point wiring to connect each
ECM to other ECMs, as shown in the left panel of Figure 4. As the number of ECMs in vehicles
continues to grow, this method requires the addition of more complex wiring. The CAN bus
offered a much more efficient solution wherein all ECMs are connected through a single two-wire
bus as shown in the right panel of Figure 1. All communications on the bus are broadcast to all
the other ECMs, which are also referred to as nodes on the CAN bus. The CAN bus is a multimaster broadcast network, meaning that all messages broadcast from one node traverse the
network and are received by every other node. Each node is responsible for determining whether
the messages received need action based on the Arbitration ID information in the transmitted
message, also known as the CAN ID.
CAN

With CAN

Central Control Module
Brake Control Module
Engine Control Module
Traction Control Module
Suspension Control Module

Figure 1. Backbone of the Controller Area Network Bus
The structure of a typical CAN frame can be broken up into several specific segments, as shown
in Figure 2. The first component of the CAN frame is the start of frame (SOF) bit, which only
indicates the beginning of the incoming frame. The next 11 bits specify the CAN ID, and each
node will analyze this ID to determine whether the message is intended for it. On the CAN bus,
a lower CAN ID has a higher priority. The IDs assigned to specific nodes are up to the system
designer’s discretion. The general practice is to assign higher-priority IDs to the more critical
nodes such as powertrain, anti-lock braking, or emergency systems. It is also common practice to
assign IDs that are close in range to nodes with similar functionality. The next bit is the remote
transmission request bit (RTR), which indicates whether the message is being sent to or requested
from the node indicated by the CAN ID. The next two bits control whether the frame is a standard
or extended frame. The data length code consists of four bits that indicate to the receiving node
how many bytes to expect in the payload of the frame. The next 16 bits are used for the calculation
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of a cyclic redundancy check for transmission accuracy, followed by a two-bit acknowledgment,
and the final seven bits are reserved to show the end of the frame.

Arbitration ID

RTR

Ext. Frame Data Length

Data

CRC

ACK

EOF

Code

Figure 2. CAN Frame Message Format
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2. Methodology
There are several options for connecting to the CAN bus in a modern vehicle. These range from
physical access connections to short- and long-range wireless options. The system design requires
a physical presence within the automobile, so we configured a physical connection to the CAN
bus. The standard physical access point to the CAN bus in a vehicle is the OBDII port,
interchangeably referred to as the DLC (diagnostic link connector) by many automobile OEMs
(original equipment manufacturers). The OBDII port is typically located on the lower left or right
side near the steering column of the vehicle. It has been standard on all automobiles since 1996
and has a sixteen-pin connection. Although it is an industry-standard connection, car
manufacturers typically utilize only about half of the pins as part of the standard, and several pins
are available for use at the manufacturer’s discretion. The standard pinout is shown in Figure 3
and Figure 4.

Figure 3. OBDII Pinout

Description

PIN

9

Description

1

OEM Choice

OEM Choice

2

J1850 +

10

j1850

3

OEM Choice

11

OEM Choice

4

Chassis Ground

12

OEM Choice

5

Signal Ground

13

OEM Choice

6

CAN High

14

CAN Low

7

ISO 9141 High

15

ISO 9141 Low

8

OEM Choice

16

Battery Power

Figure 4. OBDII Pin Functions
Miller previously found that Ford engineers employ a secondary middle-speed CAN bus operating
at 125 kbps for lower-priority ECUs. This secondary CAN bus is accessible through the OBD II
port on pins 3 and 11 for CAN high and low signals, respectively.
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When the CAN bus was originally designed, security was not a top priority. The CAN bus fails
to satisfy even the most critical security pillars of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Data
on the CAN bus are not encrypted in any fashion. Anyone or any device with access to the network
can freely eavesdrop and sniff traffic. Furthermore, the CAN bus does not support any kind of
authorization or authentication features. Additionally, there is no way to verify that any specific
message was sent or received by a specific device. Finally, CAN bus frames are delivered using
arbitration ID, which handles priority on the bus. Lower IDs have higher priority which ensures
that critical high-priority messages are delivered first. However, there is no congestion or traffic
management on the bus to protect against starvation of the lower-priority messages, which can
generate vulnerabilities for availability.
With these limitations, it is possible to physically access the CAN bus network as a new node and
read all traffic occurring within it. A typical node on the CAN bus network consists of a
microcontroller, a CAN controller, and a CAN transceiver. Most easily explained in terms of the
OSI model, the microcontroller handles the functions at the application layer including user input
and drivers for specific actuators. The CAN controller communicates between the application layer
and the data link layer transmitting and receiving the necessary information from the CAN
transceiver, which translates the data into the physical layer for transfer over the bus. This typical
node structure is shown in Figure 5.

Node
Microcontroller

I
CAN controller

+ CAN t
Transceiver
CAN High

CAN Low

Figure 5. CAN Bus Node
The CAN controller and CAN transceiver for the system are the MCP2515 and MCP2562
integrated circuits, respectively. These are packaged and assembled along with an integrated
Switched Mode Power Supply (SMPS) on the PiCan3 Raspberry Pi Hat from SK Pang
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electronics. This hardware is attached to the Raspberry Pi 40 pin GPIO connector and sits atop
the Raspberry Pi board. A cable with a standard OBD II female connector on one side and exposed
open wires on the other side is then connected to the input screw terminals on the PiCAN3. The
wire corresponding to pin 16 is connected to the 12V+ terminal, and the wire from pin 4 (chassis
ground) is connected to the ground terminal. To interface with the medium-speed CAN bus in
the test vehicle, the wire for pin 3 is connected to the CAN high terminal, and the wire for pin 11
is connected to CAN low terminal, as shown in Figure 6.

Pin 3 (CanH) and 11 (CanL) @ 125 kbps
Pin 4 Ground,Pin 16 +12 V battery.

40 pin GPIO to Raspberry Pi
MCP2515 CAN Controller
MCP2562 CAN Transceiver

Figure 6. PiCAN3 Wiring
To enable the PiCan in the Raspbian OS, the default boot configuration file of the Raspberry Pi
was modified as shown in Figure 7.

GNU nano 3.2

/boot/config.txt

uadditional
lines for Pican3HAT
dtparam=spi=on
dtoverlay=mcp2515-can0,oscillator=16000000,interrupt=25
dtoverlay=spi-bcm2835-overlay
Figure 7. Boot Configuration
Once in the vehicle settings, the Raspberry Pi will not have a direct connection to any video output
display or input devices. The sole connection is from the PiCan3 to the vehicle ODBII port.
Rather than directly connecting a monitor and keyboard to the device, a VNC server on the
Raspberry Pi can enable access to the Pi over the WiFi network using the VNC software. To
initialize and establish the socket interface on the Raspberry Pi, the command syntax is “/sbin/ip
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE

6

link set can0 up type can bitrate 1250000.” In the preceding command, “can0” is the network label
that is used moving forward to refer to the vehicle CAN bus network. The baud rate is provided
in bits and was set to 1250000 corresponding to the expected speed of the medium-speed CAN
bus (125 kbps).
For interacting with a CAN bus protocol, the Linux operating system (OS) has a very capable set
of utilities available through the open-source SocketCAN drivers. The drivers and related CANUtils provide support for the CAN bus at the network level and are installed from the repository
using the command “sudo apt-get install can-utils.” The drivers enable access to a CAN network
by initializing a socket in a very similar fashion to a TCP/IP connection and binding the socket to
an interface. Once bound, the socket can be used for reading or writing data.
CAN-Utils provide several different tools for interacting with a CAN bus network. A couple of
those tools are used to complete this project and will be discussed in the order in which they are
required. To read data from the CAN bus, the candump tool is used to dump all traffic on the
specified network to the connected display. This tool also supports filtering and logging to an
output file, but only the live display is necessary to verify an active connection to the CAN bus.
Once the vehicle ignition is set to the accessory state to make sure there is traffic on the CAN bus,
the “candump can0” command is used to produce the output in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Captured CAN Traffic
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The candump command is useful for verifying that data are being captured from the CAN bus.
However, the typical frame length is just 108 bits. Even at 125 kbps, a relatively low speed by
today’s standards, there can be up to 1,150 frames transmitted in just a single second. The rate of
change is far too fast to observe in real time. One solution to this is to use the candump logging
feature of “-l” to log all the CAN data being received. Even with a log, there is typically so much
traffic on the bus that trying to find any specific information would be impractical. Instead, it is
useful to first identify specific CAN IDs of interest and log the traffic with a filter to exclude all
other CAN IDs.
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3. Findings
Before attempting to reverse engineer the CAN bus signals on a physical vehicle, we modelled the
procedure in a CAN bus simulator. The simulator selected is the open-source ICSim (Instrument
Cluster Simulator) which was developed by Craig Smith of OpenGarges.org. When using the
simulator, the CAN network used is a virtual network. SocketCAN for Linux includes native
support for virtual CAN networks. Initially, a virtual CAN network in the OS is established, which
is then available for use by the ICSim software. It is necessary to re-enable the virtual network
following any restart of the OS. The commands were added to a setup file “setup_vcan.sh” so they
could be run easily after each restart. Note that the ICSim software requires simple direct media
layer development files to display the graphic output. Due to variations in these libraries between
Linux OS versions, ICSim is available in source code only. The dependencies are installed and
then each of the ICSim files needs to be compiled using the MAKE command before it can be
executed on the OS.
To establish communication with the CAN bus network by observing the traffic on the CAN bus,
we utilized the cansniffer tool of CAN-Utils. Cansniffer has a major advantage over candump for
this task because it will automatically filter out and remove CAN IDs that have static signals. This
will leave a view of only CAN IDs which have recently changed. The output displayed by cansniffer
left to right is as follows. First is the delta field: this field is a time delta that can be used to express
the time each can frame was received in relation to the others on the bus. The next field to the
right is the ID field. This is the CAN ID (arbitration ID) and is listed in the hexadecimal format.
The next field consists of eight columns, each displaying a hexadecimal digit representing one
nibble (4 bits) of the data payload. Directly to the right of the data payload columns is the data
information represented in ASCII character output. The cansniffer tool allows an option “-c” at
runtime which will add a color indication to any of the signals which have changed since the last
time a frame was received from that CAN ID. This is shown below in Figure 9, where the
hexadecimal and ASCII values colored in red have a changed value from the previous frame that
was received from the same CAN ID.

Edn Tabs Help
54 delta
0.206935
0.200118
0.200556
0.200512
0.199397
0.199353
0.199086
0.200885
0.199581

ID data
39
95
133
136
13A
13F
143
158
161

00
80
00
90
00
00
68
90
00

Jt
00
00
02
90
00
68
90
00

...
07
00
99
00
00
00
99
05

< cansniffer
.t
F4
00
00
00
05
FF
00
50

00 00
BC
00 90
00 00
00 00

00 26 .......

vcan0 # 1-20 h-100 t-500

>

&

00 ?~ .......
9
00 :7 .......
7
00 :o
kk ..
00 00 00 .,7 .......
7
01 08 00 28 ... p ...

.......

Figure 9. CAN Sniffer Output with Highlighted Changes
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To establish a baseline of traffic on the network, traffic is observed for a few seconds while taking
no actions. Once the baseline is established, the second step is to continue observing the traffic
while triggering an event (in this example, turn on the left turn signal). While the event is triggered,
the CAN bus traffic is observed to see if any new CAN IDs appear or if there are corresponding
changes to the signals of the existing CAN IDs that were not present before the event. Figure 10
shows the baseline compared to the new IDs (highlighted in yellow) observed when the turn signal
was activated.
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Figure 10. CAN Traffic Generated by an Event Trigger
Cansniffer provides real-time filtering options that are used to further narrow down the output.
First, all CAN IDs are removed from the output. Then, the IDs to be observed are added back to
the output by entering +188 and +164. With the output filtered to only two IDs, ID 164 is not
related to the event as it is continuously transmitting signals and was therefore a false positive
identification. That CAN ID is removed, leaving only ID 188. Observing the changing data packet
when the turn signal is engaged, it can be seen that ID 188 is directly related to the illumination
of the turn signal indicators on the IC display. It is observed that the most significant byte (MSB)
of the data payload controls this output. A data value of 00 turns the indicators off and a data value
of 02 turns the right turn signal indicator on. It is further observed that when triggering the left
turn signal, an event value of 01 is present in the MSB of the frame for CAN ID 188. It is therefore
concluded that CAN ID 188 is responsible for the display of the turn signal indicators on the
instrument cluster display. This process was repeated to identify the other CAN IDs available on
the ICSim simulator software. The reverse-engineered IDs are presented in Figure 11, where the
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signal location refers to the bit position and length in the CAN frame responsible for the indicated
event. These could constitute a spoofing or a relay attack.

Signal Location

Description

188

Byte 1

Turn Signals

244

Bytes 4 and 5

Speedometer

19B

Byte 3

Doors

CANID

Figure 11. Reverse Engineering CAN IDs
Having exhausted the events possible on the simulator, the above process is now applied to the test
vehicle. A baseline is established (see Figure 12). Events are then triggered by pressing the buttons
on the control panel to turn on the fan blowers, turn on the AC, turn on the MAX AC, and adjust
the air output through the dash and floor vents. Traffic is observed on the CAN network during
these changes, and through observation, two CAN IDs appear in the traffic whenever changes are
made. Those IDs are 387 and 388, as highlighted in Figure 13. The IDs of 387 and 388 with allzero values are the signals for the event, both of which should be simultaneously transmitted as
shown in Figures 12 and 13.
42 delta
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,0. 000000
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13 17 4F
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FF F0 00
59 00 00
42 50 2C
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17 63 7E
40 00 00

00
00
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D4 .. . O.c-.

....

00
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Figure 12. Establishing Baseline CAN on the Test Vehicle
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Figure 13. Event Trigger on the Test Vehicle
With this knowledge, we can proceed with generating the desired CAN frame, and transmitting
it to the IVN is a trivial task. For this, we use the cansend tool from CAN-Utils. Cansend transmits
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a specified CAN frame to the bus. The syntax for the command is “cansend <device>
<can_frame>.” The canframe itself is specified by the canID followed by the symbol and finally
the data payload in hexadecimal. For the system to turn on the blower, the following command is
sent: “cansend can0 387#80 00 00 00 50.” This sends a canframe with the arbitration ID of 387, a
data payload MSB of 128 and 80 in the leading byte and the fifth byte, respectively. The same
process is used to send the second required CAN frame to trigger the event. To incorporate these
into the system, which was coded entirely in Python, the Python-Can library module was
imported. This library provides an application programming interface for using all the CAN-Utils
tools in Python. Due to the potential problems that may have been caused by introduced fabricated
CAN packets on a physical vehicle, the completed system was tested while sending the CAN
frames to a virtual CAN network rather than a physical vehicle network.
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4. Summary & Conclusions
This research analyzed the common vulnerabilities of the CAN protocol, including passive and
active attacks. For passive attacks, we eavesdropped on the ongoing traffic on a simulated and an
actual CAN bus. For active attacks, we injected spoofed traffic on the CAN and observed the
impact. Experimentation was performed using various software and hardware tools to conduct
simulation, emulation, and real-time analysis. The findings outlined in Figures 11-13 suggest the
necessity of a layered defense mechanism on all pillars of systems security, from authentication to
confidentiality and integrity checks.
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